1) Domestic issues

Rwanda has made extraordinary progress since the devastation of 1994. There was real GDP growth averaging 10% per year from 1995-2000, free and fair local elections in 2002, the publication of an ambitious national strategy paper - Vision 2020 - and an admirable commitment to decentralisation and popular consultation.

Rwanda remains heavily dependent on international donors and 60% of the population live in poverty. Continued engagement by the international donor community is vital to the future prosperity of Rwanda and its people. This is why the increasing restriction of political space, the suppression of opposition voices and crack-down on media freedom - as well as continued engagement in the DRC - are of particular concern; if donors turn away from Rwanda then the spectacular gains made so far will be lost.

Therefore the UK must use its influence with the Rwandan Government to ensure space for genuine political and media freedom. If they do not, and other donors turn away – as the Dutch have threatened to do in reference to the forthcoming elections – it is the people of Rwanda who will pay the price.

· Repression of independent media.

- Although a liberal press law was passed in June 2002, authorising licenses for independent radio stations, regulatory power will lie with a national High Council of the Press. Members of the council will be appointed by the Government, calling is independence into question, and no new licenses can be granted until this council is established. There are as yet no plans to do so.

- In January 2003 the editor of leading independent newspaper Umuseso was arrested and held for five weeks. The entire first edition of a new independent paper called Indorerwamo was seized in April for carrying material that questioned the RPF Government.

· Suppression of political opposition

- The MDR, the largest opposition party in Rwanda, was earlier this year accused of promoting ethnic division by a Parliamentary Committee and summarily disbanded. Although there may be some legitimate concerns about the MDR mobilising Hutu support on an ethnically divisive basis, the MDR is supported by a large proportion of the 85% Hutu population, who will now have no representation at the forthcoming elections. This could stir unrest, followed by further repression from the RPF Government and increasing civil strife.

- The report of the EU monitors on the Constitutional Referendum noted with concern that the constitutional fail-safes introduced to avoid any resurgence of ethnic division could also limit basic freedoms.

- A number of individuals named in the Parliamentary report condemning the MDR have since disappeared (see attached Amnesty International press release). A number of political figures have been forced to resign and go into exile since 1994; the first PM Faustin Twagiramungu, his successor Pierre Rwigema and former Speaker of Parliament Joseph Sebarenzi. Former RPF Minister of Interior Seth Sendashonga was murdered 1998 in Nairobi after speaking out against human rights abuses in Rwanda. Former President Pasteur Bizimungu remains in prison.

2) Engagement in the DRC

Multiple reports describe Rwandan engagement in the DRC by proxies; their strong relationship with the RCD-G is well known and not contested, and their support for the UPC in Ituri has been attested to by several extremely reliable and reputable sources, most recently by Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group.

Equally, credible reports continue to be received of direct Rwandan army re-engagement in the east of the DRC, although this is denied by the Rwandan Government.

· Ituri Crisis

- In January 2003 the UPC and the RCD-G signed a formal alliance, allowing the openly Rwandan-backed RCD-G to support the UPC with arms, supplies and direct support. Extremely credible reports have also charged Rwanda with directly aiding the UPC and thereby exacerbating the crisis in Ituri.

- The presence of the Multinational Force in Bunia has to some degree calmed the situation, and the UPC have been generally co-operative with their demands to demilitarise the town. we still have no idea of events outside the town. Some 75% of the 300,000 population fled the fighting earlier this year.

- The province remains explosive, particularly if the MONUC contingent replacing the Multinational Force do not have the troop numbers, mandate, equipment or leadership to be effective. Although Uganda is most at fault for the situation, the proxy-war fighting activities of Kinshasa and the Rwandan Government must not be forgotten. They must all be pressed in the strongest possible terms to stop arming, training or supporting groups in the DRC. Not only would a degeneration of the situation have a terrible impact on the civilian population but would place the national settlement and prospects for regional peace in serious danger.

· RCD-G disruption of the DRC peace process

- 14th July 2003, establishment of three ‘military zones’ in areas of the DRC under RCD-G control. This can be seen as ‘muscle-flexing’ at best, a deliberate threat to the peace process and preparation for a military annexation of the Kivus and Maniema at worst. It was condemned by the International Committee for Support to the Transition (ICST) as "against the spirit of the All-Inclusive Agreement of 17th December 2002, as well as the Memorandum on the Army and Security of 29 June 2003" which then declared the decision null and void. The UK is a member of the ICST.

- 14th July 2003, refusal of RCD-G delegates to travel to Kinshasa for the swearing-in of the new Government. This could be a reasonable concern about security in Kinshasa - although this is guaranteed by the MONUC forces there – or a deliberate snub to the peace process

- June/July 2003, continued fighting in North and South Kivu. Until very recently the RCD-G was engaged in serious fighting with the RCD-ML and various Mai-Mai groups in the Kivus, despite the signature of numerous local and national peace agreements.